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Abstract 
As speakers interact, they add references to their common ground, which they can then reuse 
to facilitate listener comprehension. However, all references are not equally likely to be 
reused. The purpose of this study was to shed light on how the speakers’ conceptualisations 
of the referents under discussion affect reuse (along with a generation effect in memory 
documented in previous studies on dialogic reuse). Two experiments were conducted in 
which participants interactively added references to their common ground. From each 
participant’s point of view, these references either did or did not match their own 
conceptualisation of the referents discussed, and were either self- or partner-generated. 
Although self-generated references were more readily accessible in memory than partner-
generated ones (Experiment 1), reference reuse was mainly guided by conceptualisation 
(Experiment 2). These results are in line with the idea that several different cues (conceptual 
match, memory accessibility) constrain reference reuse in dialogue. 
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Introduction 
Dialogue is a joint activity during which at least two partners collaborate in order to reach a 
common goal such as making dinner or working together (Bangerter & Clark, 2003; Clark, 
1996). As they interact, speakers produce referring expressions, or references, to designate 
the objects and entities under discussion (“the living room table”, “the recipe I’m planning on 
making tonight”, “the boss”, “a timeslot which wouldn’t be very convenient for you”, etc.; 
e.g., Bard, Hill, Foster, & Arai, 2014; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; 
Fukumura, 2015). There are generally several different ways of talking about the same 
referent. For instance, the same table might be referred to as “the living room table” or “the 
beautiful wooden table I bought when I first moved into this place”. Speakers thus need to 
make a number of decisions about how to refer to things throughout the interaction. 
 In some cases, speakers refer to a referent several times during an interaction. When 
this happens, speakers reuse the same references, inferring that their partners should be 
capable of understanding them again (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Metzing & Brennan, 2003). 
Such inferences require high-level perspective-taking skills. However, reference reuse also 
depends on lower-level processes such as whether these references are readily accessible in 
memory to them (e.g., Horton & Gerrig, 2005b; Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014). Another factor 
which is likely to play an important role here is the way in which speakers personally view, 
or conceptualise, the referents under discussion. For instance, a piece of modern art may be 
viewed as “a weird painting” or as “an enlightened representation of humanity”. How do such 
different conceptualisations affect reference reuse? The current study seeks to address this 
question, thus contributing to a better understanding of referential decisions in dialogue. 
 
Conceptual Pacts in Dialogue 
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According to the collaborative approach to dialogue, decisions about how to refer to things 
are adaptive: each speaker favours the production of references he or she believes to be easily 
understandable for his or her current addressee(s) (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986; Fukumura, 2015; Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Nückles, Winter, Wittwer, Herbert, & 
Hübner, 2006; Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014). For instance, Speaker A and Speaker B are 
planning an afternoon out. A wants to meet B in front of a shopping centre, but B does not 
know where this centre is. In this situation, A could adapt his or her speech by locating the 
shopping centre in relation to another landmark A knows B is capable of locating. For 
instance, if A and B have already gone to a nearby cinema together, A could refer to the 
shopping centre as “the centre which is very close to that cinema we went to”. To determine 
what their current partners are capable of understanding, speakers rely on their common 
ground, which includes the knowledge that dialogue partners share and are aware of sharing 
(Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Clark, 1996; Clark & Marshall, 1978, 1981; Stalnaker, 1978). The 
common ground includes information relative to the partners’ past shared experiences (e.g., 
the fact that A and B went to the cinema together in the example above) as well as shared 
community memberships (e.g., the fact that A and B both belong to a local cinema lovers 
community). 
Past decisions about how to refer are also added to the common ground through a 
joint contribution process (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs, 1986). This process is divided into two phases. During the first phase, one of the 
speakers presents a reference he or she believes to be suited to his or her current addressee’s 
understanding (e.g., A presents the reference: “the centre which is very close to that cinema 
we went to”). This reference is then accepted by the addressee, with the latter producing 
some kind of evidence that the reference presented was understood well enough for current 
purposes (e.g., B accepts this reference by saying: “oh yes, I know where that is”). A 
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reference may be accepted more or less explicitly: the addressee might accept it by nodding 
his or her head, by saying “okay”, “hm”, by moving on to the next relevant speech turn or by 
repeating the reference presented. It may also be accepted more or less immediately after the 
presentation phase, depending on whether the addressee has enough knowledge and 
information to understand it correctly straight away or whether he or she needs additional 
information to understand the director’s initial intentions. For instance, rather than accepting 
A’s reference immediately, B might reply: “I don’t know where that is, I really can’t 
remember where that cinema was”. In such situations, A might provide more information to 
B to help him or her to understand the reference initially presented (e.g., “it’s not far away 
from High Street”). Another possibility is that B might present an alternative reference (e.g., 
“do you mean the shopping centre that’s just in front of the town hall?”). In any event, at 
some point during this process, A and B will reach mutual understanding: they will converge 
on a reference which they are both capable of understanding and which B can finally accept. 
Once presented and accepted, a reference is deemed part of the partners’ common 
ground. If either partner needs to refer to the same referent again later, he or she is likely to 
favour the reuse of the same reference in order to improve addressee comprehension. For 
instance, once the reference “the centre which is very close to that cinema we went to” (or 
any alternative reference finally accepted by B) has been added to A and B’s common 
ground, both A and B can assume that their partner should be capable of understanding this 
reference successfully if they reuse it again later during the interaction. 
The contribution process was illustrated in a study conducted by Clark and Wilkes-
Gibbs (1986) in which pairs of participants took part in a matching game (see also Fox Tree 
& Clark, 2013; Gorman, Gegg-Harrison, Marsh, & Tanenhaus, 2013; Hupet, Seron, & 
Chantraine, 1991; Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966; Lysander & Horton, 2012; Yoon & Brown-
Schmidt, 2014). One of the participants (the director) described abstract pictures (tangram 
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figures; see Figure 1 for an example) to his or her partner (the matcher) in order to allow the 
latter to arrange these pictures in a predefined order. The same task was repeated six times. 
The main result was that the participants consistently used similar references to refer to the 
same pictures across trials (e.g., “the ice skater” to describe the picture presented in Figure 1), 
relying on the common ground built during the first trial(s) to infer that the matcher should be 
capable of understanding these references again in subsequent trials. 
Building on these initial findings, Brennan and Clark (1996) suggested that dialogue 
partners rely on presentation and acceptance to establish conceptual pacts, that is, temporary 
agreements about how to refer to referents. For instance, in Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs's (1986) 
study, the director and the matcher agreed to refer to the picture presented in Figure 1 as “the 
ice skater”; the director tended to reuse this reference (rather than another, potentially suitable 
different reference) across trials. Such pacts are defined as temporary because when speakers 
face new addressees, they must establish new (and potentially different) conceptual pacts. For 
instance, if the director started a new interaction with a different matcher, he or she might use 
another reference than “the ice skater” to refer to the picture in Figure 1.Conceptual pacts 
also affect comprehension, as speakers breaking such pacts (i.e., using a new reference rather 
than reusing a reference that belongs to the common ground) impairs comprehension for 
addressees (Metzing & Brennan, 2003; see also Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014). 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
Biases in Reference Reuse 
The findings reviewed in the previous section suggest that speakers tend to reuse the same 
references when referring repeatedly to the same referent in order to adapt to their partners. 
However, there is evidence that not all presented and accepted references are equally likely to 
be subsequently reused in the remainder of the interaction. To illustrate this point, Knutsen 
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and Le Bigot (2014) ran an experiment in which pairs of participants added references to 
landmarks featured on a map to their common ground through presentation and acceptance. 
The main finding was that speakers were more likely to reuse self-presented references than 
partner-presented ones (i.e., to re-refer to landmarks corresponding to self-presented 
references more than to landmarks corresponding to partner-presented references). A similar 
finding was obtained in another study in which the participants had the opportunity to 
generate references to landmarks rather than simply read them off a map (Knutsen, Ros, & Le 
Bigot, in press). Based on this finding, the authors have suggested that reference reuse is 
subject to a self-presentation bias. However, these studies did not focus on decisions about 
how to refer per se. Indeed, when a speaker reuses a reference, he or she must make two 
different decisions, the first of which pertaining to whether to mention a referent or not, and 
the second of which pertaining to how to refer to this referent. To illustrate this distinction, 
consider the following example. A is discussing a route with B. At some point, A presents the 
following building to refer to the town hall: “this horrible building in the middle of the town”. 
B accepts this reference, thus agreeing to establish this conceptual pact and to add this 
reference to the common ground. Later during the interaction, A has the opportunity to refer 
to the same building again. At this point, A first needs to decide whether or not to mention 
this referent again. Such decisions are hereafter referred to as decisions to refer (i.e., 
decisions about whether to refer or not to a given referent, regardless of how this referent is 
actually referred to). Actual decisions about how to refer only take place after this, once A 
has decided to mention the referent. At this point, A must decide whether to maintain the 
conceptual pact by reusing the reference which was initially agreed upon or to abandon it by 
using a different reference. 
Knutsen and colleagues (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014; Knutsen et al., in press) only 
examined decisions to refer, showing that the self-presentation bias makes speakers more 
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likely to decide to mention a referent again when the reference to this referent was initially 
self-presented than when it was initially partner-presented. However, a similar self-
presentation bias might also constrain actual decisions about how to refer, making speakers 
more likely to resort to self-initiated conceptual pacts than to partner-initiated conceptual 
pacts. For instance, if Speaker A refers to a table as “an old piece of furniture” and Speaker B 
refers to the same table as “a beautiful wooden table”, the self-presentation bias could make 
A more likely to reuse the reference “an old piece of furniture” and B more likely to reuse the 
reference “a beautiful wooden table” when referring to this table again. The first purpose of 
this study is to address this possibility, thereby offering a better understanding of decisions 
about how to refer in collaborative dialogue. 
The second goal of the current study is to offer a better understanding of the processes 
underlying a potential self-presentation bias in decisions about how to refer. Knutsen and Le 
Bigot (2014) have suggested that the self-presentation bias in decisions to refer is due to a 
self-production effect in memory, whereby words produced aloud are remembered better than 
words read silently, especially when these words are self-produced (as opposed to partner-
produced; MacLeod, 2011; MacLeod, Gopie, Hourihan, Neary, & Ozubko, 2010). In cases 
where speakers generate the references at the time of presentation (Knutsen et al., in press), 
this effect could also be due to a generation effect in memory (e.g., Burnett & Bodner, 2014; 
Rosner, Elman, & Shimamura, 2013; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). These suggestions are 
corroborated by the finding that after the end of an interaction, speakers tend to remember 
self-generated content better than partner-generated content (Hjelmquist, 1984; Jarvella & 
Collas, 1974; Knutsen et al., in press). They are also corroborated by the finding that other 
occurrences of reference production during the interaction (e.g., acceptance through verbatim 
repetition as well as reuse per se) increase subsequent accessibility in memory (Knutsen & Le 
Bigot, 2014, 2015). This is in line with the idea that “ordinary” (i.e., non-specific to dialogue) 
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low-level processes play an important role in reference production in dialogue (Gorman et al., 
2013; Horton, 2007, 2008; Horton & Gerrig, 2002, 2005a, 2005b).  
Regarding decisions about how to refer, the potential tendency to reuse self-presented 
references more often could be due not only to memory, but also to additional determinants. 
In particular, it could be due to the way in which each speaker personally conceptualises, or 
“views”, the referents under discussion. For instance, if a speaker refers to the Tangram 
figure presented in Figure 1 by presenting the reference “the ice skater”, this usually means 
that the speakers “sees” an ice skater when he or she looks at this figure. Importantly, 
dialogue partners might not necessarily conceptualise the same referents in the same way. For 
instance, when Speaker A refers to the table mentioned previously as “an old piece of 
furniture” and Speaker B refers to the same table as “a beautiful wooden table”, the two 
references produced reflect two different conceptualisations of the same referent. (It is 
noteworthy that the notion of “conceptualisation” in the current study can be linked with the 
perspective-taking literature, and more particularly with the notion of Level-2 perspective-
taking, which also refers to how people “view” a scene (e.g., Flavell, Everett, Croft, & 
Flavell, 1981). However, in order to link the current work to theoretical models of language 
production (see the General Discussion), the notion of “conceptualisation” is preferred here.) 
Self-presented references being reused subsequently might therefore simply reflect 
the fact that speakers tend to “view” the same referents in the same way in addition to, or 
rather than, better memory for self-presented references
1
. One implication would be that in 
                                                 
1
 This suggestion should nonetheless be qualified in light of the fact that adding references to the common 
ground through presentation and acceptance is a joint process in which both partners play an active role: the 
partner performing the acceptance phase may suggest revising the reference initially presented (Clark & 
Brennan, 1991; Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). This point will be addressed in the 
General Discussion.  
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cases where Speaker A presents a reference which happens to match Speaker B’s 
conceptualisation of the referent under discussion, Speaker B could become more likely to 
reuse a partner-presented reference - a prediction incompatible with the (self-) 
production/generation effect account (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014; Knutsen et al., in press). In 
other words, there would be no such thing as a single “self-presentation effect” in such cases. 
Rather, generation and conceptualisation would differentially affect reference reuse. 
The idea that conceptualisation is an important determinant of reference reuse was 
addressed by Duff, Hengst, Tranel, and Cohen (2006; note that the influence of self- vs. 
partner-presentation was not assessed in this study). These authors compared decisions about 
how to refer in participants with amnesia (hippocampal amnesia; see Spiers, Maguire, & 
Burgess, 2001) and typical participants. The experimental setting was similar to that used by 
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986): the participants played a matching game which required 
referring to abstract Tangram figures. The analysis of the results revealed that just like typical 
participants, participants with amnesia reused the same references to refer repeatedly to the 
same referents when they played the role of directors. Such reuse could not be due to the fact 
that these participants remembered which references had initially been presented, as 
hippocampal amnesia prevents individuals from encoding new information in episodic 
memory. This was corroborated by the results of a follow-up test in which tangram figures 
(which had not been used in Duff et al.’s main experiment) were arbitrarily paired with nouns 
(e.g., a tangram figure looking like a rabbit was paired with the word “broom”). The 
participants were asked to learn these pairs. The analysis of their performance on a 
subsequent memory test revealed that the performance of the participants with amnesia was 
strongly impaired. On the basis of these results, the authors suggested that reference reuse 
during the matching task did not reflect the amnesic participants’ memory for references 
previously presented and accepted, but rather that the participants conceptualised the pictures 
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in the same way across trials, leading them to produce similar descriptions every time they 
encountered the same referent. 
In sum, reference reuse in dialogue could be guided by a production/generation effect 
(Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014), a “conceptual match” effect (Duff et al., 2006), or both. In many 
cases, these two effects are likely to be confounded, as it seems reasonable to assume that 
speakers often generate references which match their own conceptualisations at the time of 
initial reference presentation. This makes it particularly difficult to examine the respective 
contributions of conceptualisation and generation to dialogic reference reuse. The current 
study sought to address this question in a situation where participants made no decisions to 
refer (i.e., they did not decide which referents to refer to during the task; this was decided in 
advance by the experimenter), but had the opportunity to make decisions about how to refer 
as they interacted repeatedly about the same referents. 
 
Current Study: Overview and General Hypothesis 
The general hypothesis tested in this study was that reference reuse in dialogue is guided not 
only by a generation effect in memory (i.e., speakers reuse self-generated references more 
often than partner-generated ones), but also by a conceptual match effect (i.e., speakers reuse 
references which match their conceptualisations more than references which do not match 
their conceptualisations). In two experiments, pairs of participants added references to 
abstract Tangram figures to their common ground through presentation and acceptance. In 
some cases, the participants generated references which matched their own 
conceptualisations; in other cases, the participants were forced to generate references which 
did not match their own conceptualisations. 
 To test the general hypothesis, the study was divided into two steps. The purpose of 
the first step (Experiment 1) was to confirm that the generation effect affects not only 
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speakers’ memory for which referents were mentioned during an interaction (as shown in 
previous studies on the self-presentation bias), but also their memory for which references 
were actually used to refer to these referents – or, in other words, their memory for 
conceptual pacts (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Metzing & Brennan, 2003). The purpose of the 
second step (Experiment 2) was to examine how the generation effect and the 
conceptualisation match effect found in Experiment 1 affect reference reuse in dialogue. 
 
Experiment 1 
Rationale and Operational Hypotheses 
Experiment 1 was divided into three phases. During the first phase (Dialogue Phase), pairs of 
participants were shown various tangram figures one by one. For each figure, each participant 
was asked to generate a reference and to answer any questions his or her partner might have 
about his or her reference. Thus, each pair generated two references for each figure discussed. 
For each figure, the participants had to generate a different reference; each participant 
went first on half the trials and second on half the trials. Therefore, in some cases, each 
participant had the opportunity to present a reference that matched his or her 
conceptualisation of the picture (i.e., when he or she went first or when he or she went second 
but that the reference presented by his or her partner did not match the participant’s own 
conceptualisation); in other cases, the participant was forced to present a reference that did 
not match his or her own conceptualisation (i.e., when he or she went second and that the 
reference matching his or her conceptualisation had already been presented by his or her 
partner). In other words, each participant generated references which matched or did not 
match his or her conceptualisations and heard his or her partner generating references which 
matched or did not match his or her (i.e., the participant’s) conceptualisations. During the 
second phase of the experiment (Memory Assessment Phase), the participants were asked to 
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recall (in writing) the two references generated for each tangram figure during the Dialogue 
Phase. This allowed for examination of whether the participants’ memory for the references 
generated during the Dialogue Phase was subject to a self-generation bias. Finally, during the 
third phase of the experiment (Conceptualisation Assessment Phase), the participants were 
asked to write down, for each figure used during the Dialogue Phase, which of the two 
references generated matched their conceptualisation best. Doing so allowed for 
determination of whether the self-generation bias found in the Memory Assessment Phase 
held for references which matched the participants’ conceptualisations and also for references 
which did not. 
 The main operational hypothesis was that self-generated references are more likely to 
be recalled than partner-generated ones. The second operational hypothesis was that the self-
generation effect affects both references which match the partners’ conceptualisation and 
references which do not match the partners’ conceptualisation. 
 
Participants 
Forty native French speaking students (22 female; mean age 18.75, SD = 1.28) took part in 
the experiment for course credit. The participants signed an informed consent form before the 
beginning of the experiment and were fully debriefed after the experiment.  
 
Apparatus 
The dialogues between the participants were recorded using a TASCAM DR-40 double-entry 
digital recorder connected to two lapel microphones (one per participant). 
 
Materials 
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A hundred randomly selected tangram figures were used in this experiment (Figure 2). These 
figures came from various tangram sets. Each tangram figure was randomly assigned a 
number between 1 and 100; the figures were then randomly divided into five groups of 20 
figures labelled A, B, C, D and E (i.e., Group A was made of figures 1 through 20, Group B 
was made of figures 21 through 40, etc.; the 20 figures discussed by a pair of participants 
during the Dialogue Phase all belonged to the same group). Each figure was printed on a 
separate A6 sheet of paper for use during the Dialogue Phase. 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
 Paper booklets were then prepared for each participant to use during the Memory 
Assessment Phase. Each booklet included 20 target tangram figures (i.e., the 20 figures 
discussed during the Dialogue Phase) as well as 20 distractor tangram figures which belonged 
to another group of figures (e.g., when the target figures belonged to group A, the distractors 
belonged to group B). Two different versions of these booklets were created (the random 
order in which the figures were presented in the booklet was different in each booklet). Two 
lines were printed in front of each figure so that the participant could write down the two 
references generated during the Dialogue Phase. 
 Finally, the same pictures as in the Dialogue Phase as well as blank lined A5 sheet of 
paper were used in the Conceptualisation Assessment Phase. 
 
Task and Procedure 
The experiment was performed by pairs of participants who sat next to each other and facing 
the experimenter in a quiet experimental room. Before the beginning of the experiment, the 
participants were informed that the study sought to investigate referential communication and 
that the experimenter was simply interested in how speakers refer to abstract pictures such as 
tangram figures. They were also told that the experiment would involve more than one phase 
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but were not informed in advance of how many phases there would be or of the content of the 
different phases. 
 The Dialogue Phase was divided into 20 trials (see Table 1 for an example of a 
dialogue between two participants during a trial; in this example, the participants were 
describing the figure presented in Figure 3). At the beginning of each trial, the experimenter 
showed the participants a tangram figure (both participants were shown the same picture; 
because the participants sat next to each other, they both viewed the figure from the same 
perspective). Two random presentation orders were used in this phase. One of the participants 
(hereafter referred to as Participant X) generated a reference to designate the figure. The 
participants were then free to discuss Participant X’s decision: for instance, Participant Y 
could ask for additional information or manifest his or her understanding by saying “okay”. 
For instance, in Table 1, Participant X started by presenting the reference “someone on a 
boat”. This presentation was followed by a brief discussion during which X provided Y with 
additional information (“you have the boat here and there you have the guy”) and during 
which Y manifested his or her understanding (“yes”, “I see”). Y could also have used this 
discussion to ask X for additional information (e.g., “I don’t understand, if it’s a boat, where 
is the hull?”) or express a judgement about X’s reference (e.g., “I don’t agree at all”). Once 
Participants X and Y had finished discussing Participant X’s decision, Participant Y proposed 
a different reference to the same figure and then briefly discussed his or her decision with 
Participant X. The first reference was presented by Participant X in 50% of the trials and by 
Participant Y in the other 50% of trials. At the beginning of each trial, the experimenter 
prompted the participant whose turn it was to present the first reference to start talking. This 
participant had as much time as necessary before he or she actually started talking. 
Insert Figure 3 around here 
Insert Table 1 around here 
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 Then, during the Memory Assessment Phase, each participant performed an 
individual memory test. To this end, each participant was given a booklet and a pen. For each 
tangram figure shown in the booklet, the participant was asked to do two things: (1) to decide 
whether or not it had been shown during the Dialogue Phase and (2) if this was the case, to 
attempt to recall all of the words presented by each participant to describe this figure. The 
experimenter stayed in the room with the participants to make sure that they did not attempt 
to communicate with each other during this individual phase.  
 Finally, the participants’ conceptualisations were assessed during the 
Conceptualisation Assessment Phase. During this phase, the participants were shown again 
the 20 tangram figures they had been shown during the Dialogue Phase. These were 
presented one by one in the same order as in the Dialogue Phase; this was to make sure that 
the amount of time elapsed between the presentation of a figure during the Dialogue Phase 
and the presentation of the same figure during the Conceptualisation Assessment Phase was 
roughly the same for all figures. For each figure, each participant was first asked to say aloud 
the reference that he or she had initially presented during the Dialogue Phase. If one of the 
participants could not remember the reference which he or she had presented during the 
Dialogue Phase, his or her partner was allowed to help him or her by producing the reference 
him- or herself if he or she could remember it (this happened in less than 2% of trials, 
suggesting that the participants remembered well the references they had generated during the 
Dialogue Phase). The participants were allowed to interact at this point. The purpose of this 
was to make sure that both references were readily accessible in memory to both participants. 
Each participant’s conceptualisation was then assessed by asking him or her to write down 
which of these two references reflected his or her point of view better (the participants were 
instructed not to interact as they wrote down their answer and not to tell their partner which 
reference they had selected). The participants were specifically required to choose between 
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the two references initially generated during the Dialogue Phase: they could not use a new 
reference during this phase. 
 The participants performed the three phases of the experiment at their own pace. 
There was no break between the three phases. The experiment lasted approximately one hour. 
The participants were fully debriefed after the end of the Conceptualisation Assessment 
Phase. The three steps of the experiment are summarised in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 around here 
 
Data Coding and Experimental Design 
 Coding – generation. The interactions between the participants during the Dialogue 
Phase were transcribed and the content words (proper and common nouns, adjectives and 
verbs) presented to refer to the tangram figures were identified. Content words included 
proper nouns (e.g., “San Francisco”), common nouns (e.g., “cat”), adjectives (e.g., “tall”) and 
verbs (e.g., “to eat”). Auxiliary verbs (i.e., “to be” and “to have”), modal verbs (e.g., “can”, 
“must”), determiners (e.g., “the”, “a”, “one”), pronouns (“I”, “this”), adverbs (e.g., “often”), 
prepositions (e.g., “after”, “despite”), coordination conjunctions (e.g., “but”, “and”), 
disfluencies (e.g., “uh”, “hm”) and interjections (e.g., “phew”, “oh”) are not content words 
and were therefore not identified in the corpus. In addition, only the content words used to 
describe the tangram figures were taken into account here: the content words referring to the 
participants’ perception of the figures (e.g., “I see…”) were not taken into account. For 
instance, in the example in Table 1, the content words “boat”, “guy” and “hat” were coded as 
presented, but the words “well” (interjection), “uh” (disfluency) or “the” (determiner) were 
not coded, as they are not content words. In a similar way, the verb “to see” was not coded as 
presented, as it referred to Participant X’s perception of the figure. Only the first mention of 
each content word (for each figure presented) was taken into account. 
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 In some cases, one of the participants would present a reference and the other 
participant would complete this description. For instance, Participant X would say “I see a 
man on a boat” and Participant Y would say “yes, he seems very happy”. In such cases, the 
extra content words presented by the other participant (in this example, “happy”) were not 
taken into account. Indeed, the participants’ task was to generate two different references for 
the figures they were shown (and not to complete each other’s descriptions); therefore, the 
coding only sought to identify which content words were produced by Participant X in his or 
her descriptions on one hand and which content words were produced by Participant Y in his 
or her descriptions on the other. This led us to remove 424 content words from the dataset. 
Each content word was then coded depending on whether it had been self-generated 
or partner-generated from each participant’s point of view. For instance, in the example 
shown in Table 1, the content words “boat” and “guy” were coded as self-generated from X’s 
point of view and partner-generated from Y’s point of view; as for the content word “hat”, it 
was coded as self-generated from Y’s point of view and partner-presented from X’s point of 
view. This level of coding was used as one of the predictors in the main statistical analysis. 
 
 Coding – conceptualisation. The participants’ responses during the 
Conceptualisation Assessment Phase were examined to determine, for each tangram figure, 
which reference presented matched each participant’s conceptualisation. This allowed for 
determination of whether the references generated by each participant did or did not match 
his or her conceptualisation. For instance, if both Participant X and Participant Y indicated 
that they viewed the tangram figure described in Table 1 as “a boat” during the 
Conceptualisation Assessment Phase, this word was coded as matching one’s 
conceptualisation best from both participants’ point of view. All of the other content words 
presented to describe this picture (i.e., “guy”, which was initially presented by Participant X, 
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and “hat”, which was initially presented by Participant Y) were coded as not matching one’s 
conceptualisation from X’s point of view and from Y’s point of view. This level of coding 
was used as one of the predictors in the main statistical analysis. 
 
 Coding – recall. The participants’ memory for the references presented during the 
Dialogue Phase was assessed by examining their performance during the Memory 
Assessment Phase. For each participant and each tangram figure, each content word 
presented during the dialogue phase was coded either as recalled (code 1) or non-recalled 
(code 0). This was a binary variable; however, this variable also reflected the proportion of 
content words recalled. For instance, if Participant X presented two content words and 
Participant Y presented three content words during the Dialogue Phase and that Participant X 
recalled four of these content words, this resulted in four out of five content words being 
coded 1 for recall, which corresponded to an average recall proportion of 0.8. 
 This binary level of coding was used as the dependent variable in the main statistical 
analysis.  
 
 Independent variables. There were two independent variables in this experiment. 
The first one was Generation. From each participant’s point of view, each content word 
presented was either self-generated or partner-generated. The second one was 
Conceptualisation. From each participant’s point of view, each content word presented either 
match or did not match his or her own conceptualisation. Both variables were within-
participants.  
 
Results 
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 Descriptive statistics – Dialogue Phase. During the Dialogue Phase, the average 
number of speech turns produced per dyad was 132.70 (SD = 50.81) and the average number 
of words produced per dyad (regardless of whether these were content or non-content words) 
was 1307.65 (SD = 555.23).  
 The total number of content words presented by the participants to describe the 
tangram figures was 3241 (note that this figure does not include the content words presented 
by one participant to complement a description initiated by the other participant). The 
average number of content words produced per tangram figure per participant was 4.05 (SD = 
2.63). 
 One of the participants asked his or her partner for more information after a reference 
had been generated in 18.50% of trials (74 trials out of 20 pairs x 20 figures = 400 trials). 
Thus, clarification requests were not systematic; nonetheless, this confirms that the 
participants viewed this phase as interactive and felt that they could ask for additional 
information when necessary. 
 
 Descriptive statistics – Memory Assessment Phase. During the Memory 
Assessment Phase, fillers were incorrectly identified as having been discussed during the 
Dialogue Phase in 1.38% of cases (11 incorrect identifications out of 20 fillers x 40 
participants = 800 occurrences). Target figures were correctly identified as having been 
discussed during the Dialogue Phase in 91.88% of cases (735 correct identifications out of 20 
target figures x 40 participants = 800 occurrences). This suggests that the participants 
remembered well which referents had been discussed during the Dialogue Phase. 
 A total of 1800 content words which had been discussed during the Dialogue Phase 
were recalled during the Memory Assessment Phase (the content words corresponding to 
tangram figures which had not been discussed during the Dialogue Phase and the content 
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words which had not been produced during the Dialogue Phase, although they were recalled 
in association with a figure which had been discussed during this phase,were discarded from 
further analysis, as the hypotheses solely concerned previously produced references to known 
tangram figures). The average number of content words correctly recalled per tangram figure 
per participant was 2.25 (SD = 1.30). 
 
 Descriptive statistics – Conceptualisation Assessment Phase. During this phase, 
pairs of participants were able to recall the two references initially presented in 98.63% of 
cases (789 occurrences out of 20 pictures x 40 participants = 800 occurrences). The trials 
corresponding to the remaining 1.37% (11 trials) were discarded from further analysis, as 
these corresponded to situations in which the two references were not necessarily readily 
available for the two participants to choose from. In a similar way, trials in which the 
participants’ responses included both self- and partner-generated words (8.88% of cases: 
71/800 occurrences) were also excluded from further analysis, as these reflected cases in 
which the participants had no clear preference as to how to conceptualise the referents. The 
remaining dataset included data from 718 trials, representing a total of 2895 presented words. 
 The participants reported that the first reference presented matched their 
conceptualisation best in 60.86% of cases (437/718 occurrences). This confirms that the first 
reference presented during the Dialogue Phase sometimes matched the participants’ 
conceptualisation even when this reference was not self-generated, as the participants only 
generated the first reference in 50% of trials. They also reported that the reference that they 
had generated themselves matched their conceptualisation best in 60.31% of cases (433/718 
occurrences). This pattern of results is summarised in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 around here 
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 Main analysis: Influence of generation and conceptual match on reference recall 
during the Memory Assessment Phase. A logistic mixed model was used to analyse the 
data (for logistic analysis, see Agresti, 2002; Jaeger, 2008; for mixed models, see Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). 
Mixed models allow for the inclusion of random intercepts (which are used to account 
for potential variability across dyads, across participants, and across items) and for the 
inclusion of random slopes (which are used to account for the fact that different dyads, 
different participants and different items might differ in their sensitivity to the fixed effects 
included in the model). Mixed models are also used to account for the nesting of participants 
in larger groups such as dyads (see McMahon, Pouget, & Tortu, 2006). The current analysis 
was conducted using SAS 9.4 (GLIMMIX procedure). In line with Barr et al.’s (2013) 
recommendations, the maximal random structure justified by the experimental design (i.e., all 
random intercepts and all random slopes corresponding to within-unit IVs) was initially 
implemented. Three levels of random effects were distinguished in this analysis: dyads, 
participants and tangram figures (items). Then, in line with Kiernan, Tao, and Gibbs (2012), 
the random effects causing G-matrix convergence failure were identified and removed from 
the model. The identification of problematic random effects is performed automatically in 
SAS. Removing these random effects from the model has no effect on the outcome of the 
analysis (i.e., the model parameters remain unchanged; Kiernan et al., 2012; Knutsen & Le 
Bigot, 2014). The results reported hereafter correspond to the final model (i.e., the model in 
which the random effects causing convergence problems were not included). 
 As for logistic mixed models, they are used in situations where the outcome of the 
analysis is binary (e.g., in this experiment, any content word was either coded as recalled or 
non-recalled). One of the parameters returned by logistic models is the odd ratio (OR), which 
compares the odds associated with two different events (Jaccard, 2001). For instance, the 
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current study compared the odds of recalling self-generated content words and the odds of 
recalling partner-generated content words during the Memory Assessment Phase. If the latter 
were used as the baseline in the analysis and that an OR of 1.5 was found, this would mean 
that 1.5 self-generated content words were recalled for every one partner-generated content 
word. The corresponding 95% confidence interval is also usually reported. ORs are also 
informative with regard to effect size: larger odd ratios reflect larger effects (Agresti, 2002).  
The number of content words presented in each cell of the design varied across cells, 
making it difficult to assess the degrees of freedom should be used to determine whether or 
not the effects involved in this analysis were statistically significant. In such cases, the 
Satterthwaite approximation may be used to correct the degrees of freedom, which is what 
was done in the current study (Keselman, Algina, Kowalchuk, & Wolfinger, 1999; 
Satterthwaite, 1946). 
The model used to analyse the data included Generation (self, other), 
Conceptualisation (match, mismatch) and the interaction between these two factors as fixed 
effects. The outcome variable was the likelihood of recalling a content word during the 
Memory Assessment Phase. The random effect structure included (1) by-dyad random 
intercepts and by-dyad random slopes corresponding to Conceptualisation; (2) by-participant 
random intercepts and by-participant random slopes corresponding to Generation; (3) by-item 
random intercepts and by-item random slopes corresponding to Conceptualisation. All other 
random effects (i.e., by-dyad random slopes corresponding to Generation, by-participant 
random slopes corresponding to Conceptualisation and by-item random slopes corresponding 
to Generation) were removed from the analysis because they caused model convergence 
failure. Removing these random effects had no influence on the outcome of the analysis. 
The results are reported in Figure 4. Generation significantly predicted recall, F(1, 67) 
= 9.59, p = .003. The participants were more likely to recall self-generated content words 
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than partner-generated ones, OR = 1.43, CI.95 = 1.14, 1.80. Conceptualisation also 
significantly predicted recall, F(1, 22) = 350.09, p < .001. The participants were more likely 
to recall content words which matched their conceptualisation than content words that did not 
match their conceptualisation, OR = 16.34, CI.95 = 11.99, 22.28. Furthermore, the interaction 
between these two factors was statistically significant, F(1, 5793) = 19.67, p < .001. 
Additional pairwise comparisons (Sequential Bonferroni) were conducted to offer a better 
understanding of this pattern of results. These comparisons revealed that the difference 
between self- and partner-generated references was significant when these references 
matched the participants’ conceptualisation (p < .001) but not when these references did not 
match the participants’ conceptualisations (p = 1.00). The model parameters are reported in 
Appendix A (Table A1). 
Insert Figure 4 around here 
 As mentioned previously, generation at the time of presentation is not the sole known 
linguistic determinant of reference accessibility in memory in dialogue. Reference reuse also 
depends on how these references were initially accepted: references accepted through 
verbatim repetition are more likely to be reused in the remainder of the interaction (Knutsen 
& Le Bigot, 2012, 2014, 2015; Knutsen et al., in press). Furthermore, references reused 
during an interaction are remembered better after the end of the interaction than references 
which were not reused (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014, 2015; Knutsen et al., in press). In the 
current study, this kind of reused is labelled “short-term reuse” in order to distinguish it from 
longer-term reuse (i.e., reuse occurring in subsequent interactions between the same partners, 
such as reuse during the Matching Phase in Experiment 2). 
These two determinants of reference reuse were not of prime interest in the current 
study; furthermore, the number of acceptances and short-term reuses in this study was too 
small to include these as fixed effects in the model. Nonetheless, acceptance and short-term 
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reuse could have affected the participants’ memory performance during the Memory 
Assessment Phase. To discard this eventuality, the participants’ interactions during the 
Dialogue Phase were coded for acceptance and short-term reuse (i.e., reuse during the 
Dialogue Phase); a statistical analysis was then performed to determine whether the effects of 
Generation and Conceptualisation found in the main analysis remained significant when 
Acceptance and Reuse were controlled for. This analysis is reported in Appendix B: it 
confirmed that the effects of Generation and Conceptualisation on recall remained significant 
even when these additional determinants were taken into account. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to determine whether speakers’ memory for decisions 
about how to refer is subject to a generation effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978). The results 
corroborated this idea, as the participants recalled the content words they had generated 
themselves better than the content words which had been generated by their partner. This 
confirms and extends previous work on how production and generation affect collaborative 
dialogue (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014; Knutsen et al., in press), shedding light on how low-
level processes affect speakers’ memory for past interactions (see also Knutsen & Le Bigot, 
2015). 
 Conceptual match was also taken into account in Experiment 1. The results revealed 
that content words were more likely to be recalled when they matched the participants’ 
conceptualisations than when they did not. However, this effect did not necessarily reflect 
better memory for these words. Indeed, one possibility is that the participants perceived the 
figures they were shown during this phase in the same way as in the Dialogue Phase, thus 
causing them to use the same words to describe them again in an individual task (see Duff et 
al., 2006).  
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 Moreover, the interaction between Generation and Conceptualisation revealed that the 
self-generation effect was only statistically significant when the references recalled matched 
one’s own conceptualisations. This does not necessarily imply that references which do not 
match one’s own conceptualisations are not subject to a generation effect as well. Indeed, no 
conclusions can be drawn from the lack of a significant difference between self- and partner-
generated references in this condition. However, this suggests that the generation effect is 
attenuated for references which do not match one’s own conceptualisations. This could be 
due to a floor effect in this experiment: the participants might have had difficulty recalling 
the references which did not match their own conceptualisations, regardless of who had 
generated them. In any event, the significant interaction also reflects the fact that the 
participants’ tendency to recall better references which matched their own conceptualisations 
was stronger when these references had initially been self-generated (rather than partner-
generated). Thus, references which benefit from both a generation effect and a conceptual 
match effect are remembered better than any other references. 
 In sum, Experiment 1 suggests that past decisions about how to refer are subject to a 
generation effect – at least in cases where these references match one’s conceptualisations of 
the referents under discussion. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to build on this initial 
finding by examining how these two factors affect actual reference reuse in dialogue. To this 
end, in Experiment 2, the initial Dialogue Phase was followed by a matching game instead of 
a memory test. This game gave the participants the opportunity to reuse the references 
presented during the Dialogue Phase, allowing us to examine how generation and 
conceptualisation affect reference reuse. 
 
Experiment 2 
Rationale and Operational Hypotheses 
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Just like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was divided into three phases. The first phase was 
identical to the Dialogue Phase in Experiment 1. Then, the participants embarked on a 
Matching Phase during which they took turns describing tangram figures to each other (in 
target trials, these figures had already been discussed during the Dialogue Phase). Finally, the 
participants’ conceptualisations were assessed in a third phase, which was identical to the 
Conceptualisation Assessment Phase in Experiment 1. 
Two operational hypotheses about reference reuse during the Matching Phase were 
formulated. The first hypothesis was that if reuse during the Matching Phase is mainly guided 
by generation (as suggested by Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014), the participants will reuse self-
generated references more often than partner-generated ones regardless of whether these 
references match their conceptualisation or not. By contrast, the second hypothesis was that if 
reuse during the Matching Phase depends both on generation and conceptual match, the 
participants will reuse self-generated references more often than partner-generated references 
and references that match their conceptualisations more often than references that do not. 
 
Participants 
Forty participants (35 female; mean age 18.40, SD = 0.93) were recruited under the same 
conditions as in Experiment 1 to take part in Experiment 2. 
 
Apparatus 
The same digital recorders as in Experiment 1 were used to record the interactions between 
the two participants in the first two phases of the experiment. 
 
Materials 
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The same tangram figures as in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2. As in Experiment 
1, each figure was printed on a separate A6 sheet of paper for use during the Dialogue Phase. 
 Paper booklets were prepared for use during the Matching Phase (see Figure 5). Each 
booklet was 40 pages long. Four different tangram figures were printed on each page. One of 
these figures was one of the figures discussed during the Dialogue Phase (each of the figures 
discussed during the Dialogue Phase thus appeared twice in each booklet) and the other three 
belonged to a different group (e.g., the booklets prepared for the dyads who initially 
discussed the figures from group A also included the figures from groups B, C and D). The 
position of the figure discussed during the Dialogue Phase among the other three figures was 
randomized. Two random page presentation orders were used to create these booklets. Five 
booklets were created depending on which group of figures (A, B, C, D or E) had been 
discussed during the Dialogue Phase. 
Two complementary versions of each of these five booklets were then created (see 
Figure 5). The two versions of the same booklet included the same tangram figures printed in 
the same order. In the first version, on even-numbered pages (20 in total), the target figure 
was encircled by a red square; on odd-numbered pages, the target figure was not encircled 
(20 in total). In the second version of the same booklet, target figures were encircled on odd-
numbered pages. In other words, when the target figure was encircled in one of the booklets, 
it was not encircled in the other booklet. In 50% of cases, the target figure was the figure 
discussed during the Dialogue Phase; in the other 50% of cases, the target figure belonged to 
another group. Pairs of complementary booklets were elaborated so that each figure discussed 
during the Dialogue Phase served as target once and as distractor once. The purpose of this 
was to prevent the participants from inferring that when the array of figures included one of 
the figures discussed during the Dialogue Phase, the figure was necessarily the target during 
the Matching Phase. 
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Insert Figure 5 around here 
The materials used during the third phase were identical to those used during the 
Conceptualisation Assessment Phase in Experiment 1. 
 
Task and Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, the participants were informed that the experiment would be divided into 
several phases, but they were not informed in advance of what they would be asked to do 
during each of these phases. The Dialogue Phase in this experiment was identical to the 
Dialogue Phase in Experiment 1 (see Table 4 for a dialogue sample in this phase; the figure 
discussed in this sample can be found in Figure 6). 
Insert Figure 6 around here 
Insert Table 4 around here 
 The Matching Phase was divided into 40 trials, each corresponding to a different page 
of the participants’ booklets. In each trial, the task of the participant playing the role of 
director was to describe the tangram figure encircled by a red square to the participant 
playing the role of matcher so that the latter could find this figure among the four represented 
on his or her booklet and give the director the corresponding number (1, 2, 3 or 4, starting 
from the left). The trial ended after the director had confirmed that the matcher’s answer was 
correct. The participants switched roles (Director and Matcher) after each trial, implying that 
each participant had the opportunity to describe 10 target figures and 10 filler figures to his or 
her partner during this phase (see Table 5 for two dialogue samples from this phase). 
Insert Table 5 around here 
 Finally, the Conceptualisation Assessment Phase in this experiment was identical to 
the Conceptualisation Assessment Phase in Experiment 1. The participants performed the 
three phases of the experiment at their own pace and were fully debriefed after the end of the 
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Conceptualisation Assessment Phase. The experiment lasted approximately one hour. The 
three steps of the experiment are summarised in Table 6. 
Insert Table 6 around here 
 
Data Coding and Experimental Design 
 Coding – generation and conceptualisation. The data from the Dialogue Phase and 
the Conceptualisation Assessment Phase were coded for generation and conceptualisation in 
the same way as in Experiment 1. 532 words were removed from the dataset due to having 
been presented by one of the participants to complement the other participant’s description 
during the Dialogue Phase.  
 
 Coding – reuse during the Matching Phase. The content words produced by the 
Director during the Matching Phase were identified as in Experiment 1. For instance, in the 
examples given in Table 5, Director X produced the content words “boar” and “warthog” 
(Upper Panel) and Director Y produced the content words “UFO”, “diamond” and “square” 
(Lower Panel). The list of content words was then used to code each word generated during 
the Dialogue Phase as reused (code 1) or non-reused (code 0). For instance, in the example 
provided in Tables 4 and 5, the content word “warthog”, which was generated by Participant 
X during the Dialogue Phase, would have been coded as reused by this participant during the 
Matching Phase. All other content words initially generated during the Dialogue Phase (i.e., 
“boat” and “anchor”) would have been coded as non-reused. Just like recall in Experiment 1, 
reuse was a binary variable. In addition to this, the content words produced in fillers trials 
were not coded for reuse, as the figures discussed during these trials had not been discussed 
during the Dialogue Phase. 
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This level of coding was used as the dependent variable in the main statistical 
analysis. 
 
 Independent variables. Just like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 involved two within-
participants independent variables, Generation and Conceptualisation. These were coded in 
the same way as in Experiment 1.  
 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics – Dialogue Phase. During the Dialogue Phase, the average 
number of speech turns per dyad was 158.60 (SD = 69.11) and the average number of words 
produced by dyad (regardless of whether these were content or non-content words) was 
1434.95 (SD = 649.84). The total number of content words presented by the participants was 
3406 (note that this figure does not include the content words presented by one participant to 
complement a description initiated by the other participant). The average number of content 
words produced per tangram figure per participant was 4.26 (SD = 2.85). 
One of the participants asked his or her partner for more information after a reference 
had been generated in 14.50% of trials (58 trials out of 20 pairs x 20 figures = 400 trials).  
 
 Descriptive statistics – Matching Phase. During the Matching Phase, the average 
number of speech turns per dyad was 156.10 (SD = 39.90) and the average number of words 
(including content and non-content words) produced per dyad was 861.60 (SD = 373.12). A 
total of 562 (non-necessarily unique, as part of the words presented within a dyad might have 
also been presented within one or several other dyads) content words which had been 
presented during the Dialogue Phase were reused by the Directors on target trials (i.e., trials 
in which the figure to describe had previously been discussed during the Dialogue phase; the 
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data corresponding to non-target trials were not analysed further, as no hypothesis was 
formulated concerning these trials). The average number of reused content words per tangram 
figure per director was 1.41 (SD = 0.98). 
 Matchers managed to find the target figure in their first attempt in 96.25% of trials 
(770 trials out of 20 dyads x 40 trials = 800 trials in total), suggesting that the task was 
relatively easy for the participants. 
 
 Descriptive statistics – Conceptualisation Assessment Phase. The trials in which 
the participants were not able to recall the two references initially presented and the trials in 
which the participants’ responses included both self- and partner-generated words (15.38% of 
cases: 123 out of 800 occurrences) were excluded from further analysis. The remaining 
dataset thus included data from 677 trials, which represented a total of 2945 presented words. 
 The participants reported that the first reference presented matched their 
conceptualisation best in 59.68% of cases (404/677 occurrences). They also reported that the 
reference that they had generated themselves matched their conceptualisation best in 63.52% 
of cases (430/677 occurrences). This pattern of results is summarized in Table 7. 
Insert Table 7 around here 
This pattern of results is informative with regard to a potential confound in this study. 
Indeed, one might suggest that giving the participants the opportunity to reuse the references 
presented in the Dialogue Phase during the Matching Phase (and to assess the efficiency of 
such reuse on their partners’ comprehension) might have biased the participants’ responses 
during the Conceptualisation Assessment Phase. For instance, they might have revised their 
initial preferences by answering that whichever references allowed them to successfully 
complete trials during the Matching Phase matched their conceptualisations best. The pattern 
of results reported in Table 2 being so similar to that obtained in Experiment 1 (during which 
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the participants did not perform a matching task) seems to go against this idea. An additional 
analysis was conducted to confirm that the participants’ responses were not significantly 
different across both experiments. No differences were found (all Fs < 1). This point is 
addressed further in the General Discussion.  
 
Main analysis: Influence of generation and conceptual match on reference reuse 
during the Matching Phase. The data were analysed following the same rationale as in 
Experiment 1, except that the dependent variable was reuse during the Matching Phase rather 
than recall. The model used to analyse the data included Generation (self, other) and 
Conceptualisation (match, mismatch) as fixed effects. The interaction between these two 
factors was removed from the model, as it failed to reach statistical significance, F(1, 139) = 
0.01, p = .914. The outcome variable was the likelihood of reusing a content word during the 
Matching Phase. The random effect structure included (1) by-dyad random slopes 
corresponding to Generation and Conceptualisation; (2) by-participant random slopes 
corresponding to Generation and Conceptualisation; (3) by-item random slopes 
corresponding to Generation and Conceptualisation. All other random effects (i.e., by-dyad 
random intercepts, by-participant random intercepts and by-item random intercepts) were 
removed from the analysis because they caused convergence failure. Removing these random 
effects had no influence on the outcome of the analysis. 
The results are reported in Figure 7. Conceptualisation significantly predicted reuse, 
F(1, 29) = 114.57, p < .001. The participants were more likely to reuse content words which 
matched their conceptualisation than content words which did not OR = 15.82, CI.95 = 9.34, 
26.82. However, the effect of Generation on reuse failed to reach statistical significance, F(1, 
30) = 2.90, p = .099. The model parameters are reported in Appendix A (Table A2). 
Insert Figure 7 around here 
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An additional statistical analysis confirmed that the same pattern of results was found 
even when Acceptance and Short-term reuse were taken into account (Appendix B).  
 
Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine how generation and conceptualisation affect 
reference reuse in order to offer a better understanding of dialogic decisions about how to 
refer (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014; Knutsen et al., in press). The results confirmed that 
reference reuse during the Matching Phase was guided by conceptualisation: directors were 
more likely to reuse a reference when it matched their conceptualisation than when it did not. 
This is in line with the idea that the reuse of references form the common ground might 
reflect not only their memory of what was said previously, but also the speakers’ tendency to 
perceive referents in the same way each time they are exposed to them. This replicates Duff 
et al.'s (2006) work and extends their findings to typical individuals. Unexpectedly, however, 
the effect of generation on reuse failed to reach statistical significance in this experiment, 
preventing us from concluding that references which are more readily accessible in memory 
(as shown in Experiment 1) are also more likely to be reused. This is incompatible with the 
idea that reference reuse in dialogue is systematically subject to a self-presentation bias, as it 
implies that the conceptualisation match effect sometimes caused participants to favour the 
reuse of partner-presented references. Importantly, we cannot discard the possibility that the 
lack of a significant generation effect could be due at least in part to directors trying to adapt 
their descriptions by favouring the reuse of references which had originally been generated 
by their partner (i.e., the matcher). The data do not support the idea that this kind of 
behaviour was systematic across participants and/or across items, but it might have been 
frequent enough to “cancel” any potential self-generation bias in this study.  
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General Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 and 2 contribute to a better understanding of the low-level 
memory and conceptual processes at play during dialogue. First, the results of Experiment 1 
suggest that at least some decisions about how to refer (namely, decisions which match one’s 
conceptualisations) are subject to a generation effect: self-generated content words are 
remembered better than partner-generated ones (Burnett & Bodner, 2014; Rosner et al., 2013; 
Slamecka & Graf, 1978). This has important theoretical consequences. Indeed, one of the 
central ideas developed within the framework of the collaborative approach to dialogue is 
that all partners involved in an interaction come to share a similar representation of their 
common ground (Clark, 1996; Clark & Marshall, 1981). The current results nuance this 
assumption by suggesting that dialogue partners may share a representation of their common 
ground, but that they are subject to a bias in storing and/or retrieving common ground 
information. In particular, the generation effect implies that references which are readily 
accessible to A are not necessarily readily accessible to B, and vice-versa.  
We have previously suggested that this pattern of results (i.e., each speaker 
remembering the information they presented better than the information presented by others 
after the end of an interaction) has direct implications for partner-adaptation in subsequent 
interactions (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2015). Indeed, part of the common ground consists in the 
information mentioned during past interactions between the same dialogue partners (Brennan 
& Clark, 1996; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Metzing & Brennan, 2003). Such bias in 
conversational memory could therefore lead each speaker to favour the reuse of self-
presented references for subsequent adaptation purposes. However, the results of Experiment 
2 do not support this suggestion. Although self-generated references were more readily 
accessible in memory than partner-generated ones, reference reuse in this experiment was 
mainly guided by conceptualisation. Such conceptual match effect affected both self- and 
Conceptual match effects in dialogue 
36 
partner-generated references. This implies that in a situation where Speaker A hears Speaker 
B generating a reference that matches his or her (i.e., A’s) own perception of the topic under 
discussion, A is capable of reusing this information later during the interaction – despite it 
being less readily accessible in memory than self-generated information.  
A potential confound in this study was addressed by comparing the participants’ 
responses during the Conceptualisation Assessment Phase in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
The main concern here was that having the opportunity to discuss the figures again in 
Experiment 2 (i.e., during the Matching Phase) might have caused the participants to 
reconceptualise at least some of the stimuli used. For instance, at the end of the Dialogue 
Phase, Participant X might have believed that the reference “the cat” was most appropriate to 
refer to one of the figures, but realising that Participant Y had difficulty understanding this 
reference during the Matching Phase or hearing Participant Y using the alternative reference 
(e.g., “the fox”) during this phase might have altered Participant X’s response during the 
Conceptualisation Assessment Phase. However, the lack of a significant difference in the 
participants’ responses in Experiment 1 (where the tangram figures were not discussed again 
after the Dialogue Phase) and Experiment 2 (where they were discussed again) is not in 
support of this possibility. However, another possibility which cannot be discarded is that the 
participants’ conceptualisations might have changed during the Dialogue Phase. For instance, 
when shown a figure during the Dialogue Phase, Participant X might have conceptualised it 
as a cat, thus leading him or her to generate the reference “the cat”, but subsequently hearing 
Participant Y generating the reference “the fox” during the same phase might have led 
Participant X to reconceptualise this referent and to now view it as a fox as well. This would 
not be a major issue for the current study, as this new conceptualisation (which would have 
potentially affected Participant X’s behaviour in phase 2) would have been captured during 
the Conceptualisation Assessment Phase (i.e., Participant X would have selected “the fox” 
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rather than “the cat” during this phase). Nonetheless, it would be interesting to examine 
whether initial conceptualisations and re-conceptualisations affect reference reuse in the same 
way. The current study was not designed to address this question, but this point should be 
addressed in future research. 
In sum, the main implication of this study is that the notion of “self-presentation bias” 
should be used with caution, as it seems that that such bias could reflect conceptual match in 
addition to, or instead of, self-generation. As suggested in the Introduction, it seems 
reasonable to assume that these two determinants are often confounded in everyday 
conversation (and potentially in many laboratory experiments on spontaneous dialogue): 
speakers tend to generate references which match their conceptualisation at the time of initial 
presentation. However, in cases where a self-presented reference does not match one’s 
conceptualisation of the referent under discussion, reuse depends more on conceptual match 
than on generation. Thus, the notions of “self-generation bias” and “conceptual match bias” 
should be preferred to the single notion of “self-presentation bias” in order to account more 
precisely for reuse biases in dialogue. 
 
Links with Theoretical Models of Language Production 
The results from the current study as well as previous findings (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014; 
Knutsen et al., in press) suggest that memory processes and conceptual processes affect 
dialogic reference reuse. The idea that different kinds of constraints may affect language 
production and comprehension is not new in dialogue research (see Hanna, Tanenhaus, & 
Trueswell, 2003; Kronmüller & Barr, 2015). Precisely, many of the studies focusing on this 
idea have sought to investigate the time course by which these constraints influence language 
processing. The current study was not designed to answer the question of when accessibility 
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in memory and conceptual match affect reference production (and whether or not they do so 
simultaneously), but suggestions can nonetheless be formulated at this point. 
Most theoretical models of language production involve a conceptual preparation 
phase (during which the information regarding which ideas a speaker intends to express and 
which perspective he or she will use to express these is retrieved) followed by a lexical 
selection phase (during which the corresponding lexical representations are retrieved) (e.g., 
Dell, 1986; Levelt, 1989; Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999). Our suggestion is that the 
conceptual preparation phase is subject to self-generation bias as well as a conceptual match 
bias. Indeed, decisions to refer and decisions about how to refer are made during this phase. 
Decisions to refer were not investigated in the current study, but there is evidence that such 
decisions are subject to a self-generation bias (Knutsen et al., in press; see also Knutsen & Le 
Bigot, 2014) which makes speakers more likely to re-refer to referents corresponding to self-
presented references than to re-refer to referents corresponding to partner-presented 
references.  
As for the conceptual match bias, the “old piece of furniture/beautiful wooden table” 
example discussed in the Introduction can be used to illustrate our point. In this example, 
Speaker A refers to a table as “an old piece of furniture” and Speaker B refers to the same 
table as “a beautiful wooden table” (in this example, these two references reflect each 
participant’s conceptualisation of the referent). Later during the interaction, Speaker A 
intends to refer to the same table again. To do this, A must first go through the conceptual 
preparation phase. At this point, A has the choice between at least two different 
conceptualisations (i.e., the two conceptualisations corresponding to the two references); the 
conceptual match effect should cause him or her to select the “old piece of furniture” 
conceptualisation. The activation then spreads to the corresponding node at the lexical level, 
eventually leading Speaker A to reuse the reference “the old piece of furniture” again. 
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It is noteworthy that in this example, the preferred conceptualisation is associated 
with self-generated words. However, imagine a situation in which this is not the case. For 
instance, both Speaker A and Speaker B conceptualise the table as an old piece of furniture, 
and B presents the corresponding reference first. Later during the interaction, A intends to 
refer to the same table again. In this kind of situation, activation should spread from the “old 
piece of furniture” conceptualisation to the corresponding reference, thus facilitating the 
production of an initially partner-generated reference. This could also help explain why the 
generation effect did not significantly affect reuse in Experiment 2: the activation of preferred 
conceptualisations might have led to the activation of the corresponding references regardless 
of who had initially generated them. 
Although conceptual match plays an important role in dialogic reference production, 
there are nonetheless a number of situations in which speakers are capable of producing 
references which do not match their own conceptualisations. This is especially apparent in 
studies in which experts interact with novices. For instance, computer experts are capable of 
adapting their speech depending on the level of knowledge of the partners they interact with 
(Nückles et al., 2006). In such situations, reference production mainly reflects the speakers’ 
beliefs regarding their partners’ level of knowledge rather than their own conceptualisations.  
In sum, the conceptual preparation phase appears to be subject to two main biases: a 
self-generation bias which affects which referents speakers decide to talk about, and a 
conceptual match bias which affects how people talk about these referents. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, the conceptual assessment phase is followed by lexical selection, raising 
the question of whether and how these two biases affect this phase as well. One possibility is 
that in cases where a single conceptualisation is associated with both self- and partner-
generated words (e.g., A says [about a tangram figure]: “it looks like a guy leaning against a 
tree” and B replies: “yes, he looks very happy”), a self-generation effect would cause each 
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speaker to favour the reuse of initially self-generated words. The current study was not 
designed to address this possibility, although self-generated words being more readily 
accessible in memory in Experiment 1 would be consistent with this account.  
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
One main limitation of the current study is that pairs of participants were explicitly required 
to generate two different references for each tangram figure discussed. The purpose of this 
was to distinguish the effects of generation and/or conceptual match on reference reuse; 
however, it is unreasonable to assume that dialogue partners would spontaneously adopt this 
kind of behaviour in real-life dialogue. Rather, in such situations, one of the partner might 
generate a reference matching his or her conceptualisation of the referent under discussion; 
this reference would then be accepted by the other participant (Clark & Schaefer, 1989). This 
raises the question of whether accepting a reference necessarily involves adopting the same 
conceptualisation as the partner who initially presented the reference. Another question raised 
concerns whether conceptualisations must necessarily belong to the common ground in order 
for them to be used as cues to reference production. Indeed, in Experiment 2, the reference 
which matched the director’s conceptualisation best systematically belonged to the 
participants’ common ground (as it had been discussed during the Dialogue Phase), implying 
that the matcher was presumably capable of understanding it (regardless of whether it 
matched his or her own conceptualisation as well or not). It was therefore not possible to 
determine whether the directors favoured the reuse of such references because they knew that 
their partners were capable of understanding them, or whether they simply favoured the reuse 
of references which were easy to produce for them. Finally, future studies should seek to 
generalise the current findings to situations in which dialogue partners refer to stimuli other 
than abstract tangram figures. One of the main features of these pictures is that they are not 
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usually associated with a predefined label, involving that dialogue partners must explicitly 
negotiate which references should be used to refer to them (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986; Duff et al., 2006). However, in real-life dialogue, speakers also refer to more 
consensual referents (e.g., place names, people’s names and object names). The influence of 
conceptual match on the production of such references might be smaller than in the current 
study, as there might be less room for speakers to think about how they might conceptualise 
the referents in this kind of situation.  
 
Conclusion 
At least two different constraints affect the reuse of references that belong to the common 
ground: accessibility in memory (which may depend on initial reference generation) and 
conceptualisation. This finding is compatible with the idea that low-level, “ordinary” 
processes (i.e., processes which are not specific to dialogue) influence reference production 
(and comprehension) during dialogue (e.g., Gorman et al., 2013; Horton & Gerrig, 2002, 
2005a, 2005b; Horton & Slaten, 2012). This idea was initially developed within the 
framework on the memory-based approach to dialogue, which emphasizes the role played by 
automatic memory processes in partner-adaptation. The current findings advocate for a 
broadening of the scope of this approach, as it seems that reference production depends on 
conceptual processes as well.  
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Appendix A: Model parameters 
 
Table A1 
Experiment 1 – Model parameters for the main analysis 
Covariance parameter estimates 
Parameter Subject Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept Dyad 0.04 0.07 
Conceptualisation Dyad 0.12 0.07 
Intercept Participant 0.02 0.04 
Generation Participant 0.09 0.05 
Intercept Item 0.14 0.06 
Conceptualisation Item 0.07 0.05 
 
Fixed effects 
Effect Estimate Standard Error DF t Value p value 
Intercept -1.40 0.13 47 -11.10 < .001 
Generation: self -0.05 0.10 45 -0.50 0.62 
Generation: partner 0     
Conceptualisation: match 2.39 0.18 42 13.51 < .001 
Conceptualisation: no match 0     
Self * Match 0.82 0.18 5793 4.43 < .001 
Self * No match 0     
Partner * Match 0     
Partner * No match 0     
Note. An estimate of 0 implies that this level was used as the baseline in the analysis. Note 
that in this table, the Generation effect seems to be non-significant, although it was found to 
be significant in the main analysis (F(1, 67) = 9.59, p = .003). This is because in models 
which include more than one factor, model parameters for one factor are calculated in the 
baseline level of the other factor. In other words, here, the model parameters for Generation 
correspond to the models parameters for this factor in the no-match condition only. The fact 
that the overall Generation effect was significant and the significant interaction confirm that 
although the effect of Generation was not significant in the no-match condition, it was 
significant in the matching condition. 
 
Table A2 
Experiment 2 – Model parameters for the main analysis 
Covariance parameter estimates 
Parameter Subject Estimate Standard Error 
Generation Dyad 0.21 0.12 
Conceptualisation Dyad 0.42 0.18 
Generation Participant 0.03 0.09 
Conceptualisation Participant 0.07 0.10 
Generation Item 0.21 0.09 
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Conceptualisation Item 0.14 0.10 
 
Fixed effects 
Effect Estimate Standard Error DF t Value p value 
Intercept -2.57 0.22 49 -11.61 < .001 
Generation: self 0.36 0.21 30 1.70 .099 
Generation: partner 0     
Conceptualisation: match 2.76 0.26 29 10.70 < .001 
Conceptualisation: no match 0     
Note. An estimate of 0 implies that this level was used as the baseline in the analysis.  
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Appendix B: Additional analyses (Experiments 1 and 2) 
 
Experiment 1 
To examine whether the participants’ performance during the Memory Assessment Phase 
depended on other determinants than Generation and Conceptualisation, the data were 
recoded for Acceptance and Short-term reuse.  
 A presented content word was coded as accepted through verbatim repetition (code 1) 
when the participant who did not perform the presentation repeated it between the moment 
when its initiator presented it and the moment when he or she produced another content word. 
All other presented content words were coded as accepted through another mean (code 0).  
 All occurrences of content word production which did not count as presentations or 
acceptances through verbatim repetition were coded as reuses. Following previous work on 
the self-presentation bias, a reference was counted as reused only if the speech turn in which 
it occurred was preceded by a minimum of two speech turns during which it did not occur 
(Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012). Therefore, each reference presented was either coded as reused 
(code 1; note that this code was used regardless of how many times the reference had actually 
been reused) or non-reused (code 0). Note that these two variables (Acceptance and Short-
term reuse) were coded at the dyadic level: an accepted reference was coded as accepted from 
both participants’ point of view and a reused reference was coded as reused from both 
participants’ point of view. In the final dataset (i.e., the dataset used in the main analysis), the 
total number of content words coded as accepted through verbatim repetition was 183 (4.77% 
of all content words presented) and the total number of content words coded as reused was 
162 (5.60% of all content words presented).  
 A logistic mixed model was used to analyse the data. Following the same rationale as 
in the main analysis, this model included Generation and Conceptualisation as fixed effects 
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and recall as the outcome variable. The initial model also included all random intercepts and 
random slopes justified by the design. It also included by-dyad, by-participants and by-item 
random slopes corresponding to Acceptance and Reuse. This allowed us to remove from the 
model the variability associated with these two factors. 
The random effects causing model convergence failure were then removed from the 
model, which did not affect the outcome of the analysis (removing the random slopes 
corresponding to Acceptance and Short-term reuse during this process would imply that the 
variability associated with these random effects was equal to zero). 
 The random effects structure of the final model included (1) by-dyad random slopes 
corresponding to Conceptualisation, Acceptance and Short-term reuse; (2) by-participant 
random intercepts and by-participant random slopes corresponding to Generation; (3) by-item 
random slopes corresponding to Conceptualisation, Acceptance and Short-term reuse.  
Generation significantly predicted recall, F(1, 69) = 10.99, p = .002. The participants 
were more likely to recall self-generated content words than partner-generated ones, OR = 
1.45, CI.95 = 1.16, 1.82. Conceptualisation also significantly predicted recall, F(1, 25) = 
408.01, p < .001. The participants were more likely to recall content words which matched 
their conceptualisations than content words that did not match their conceptualisations, OR = 
16.43, CI.95 = 12.35, 21.86.  
Furthermore, the interaction between these two factors was statistically significant, 
F(1, 5793) = 18.84, p < .001. Additional pairwise comparisons (Sequential Bonferroni) were 
conducted to offer a better understanding of this pattern of results. These comparisons 
revealed that the difference between self- and partner-generated references was significant 
when these references matched the participants’ conceptualisation (p < .001) but not when 
these references did not match the participants’ conceptualisations (p = 1.00). The model 
parameters are reported in Table B1.  
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 This pattern of results is identical to the one reported in the main analysis. These 
results confirm that the effects of Generation and Conceptualisation remained statistically 
significant even when Acceptance and Short-term reuse were taken into account in the 
analysis. 
 
Table B1 
Experiment 1 – Model parameters for the additional analysis 
Covariance parameter estimates 
Parameter Subject Estimate Standard Error 
Conceptualisation Dyad 0.09 0.05 
Acceptance Dyad 0.34 0.15 
Short-term reuse Dyad 0.38 0.16 
Intercept Participant 0.03 0.04 
Presentation Participant 0.08 0.04 
Conceptualisation Item 0.07 0.05 
Acceptance Item 0.15 0.08 
Short-term reuse Item 0.05 0.07 
 
Fixed effects 
Effect Estimate Standard Error DF t Value p value 
Intercept -1.05 0.19 47 -5.50 < .001 
Generation: self -0.03 0.10 45 -0.33 0.74 
Generation: partner 0     
Conceptualisation: match 2.39 0.17 55 14.21 < .001 
Conceptualisation: no match 0     
Self * Match 0.81 0.19 5793 4.34 < .001 
Self * No match 0     
Partner * Match 0     
Partner * No match 0     
Note. An estimate of 0 implies that this level was used as the baseline in the analysis. 
 
Experiment 2 
The dialogues between the participants during the Dialogue Phase were coded for Acceptance 
and Short-term reuse. In the final dataset, the total number of content words coded as 
accepted through verbatim repetition was 102 (3.46% of all content words presented) and the 
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total number of content words coded as reused was 95 (3.23% of all content words 
presented). 
 This additional analysis was conducted following the same rationale as the additional 
analysis in Experiment 1. The random effects structure of the final model included the same 
random intercepts and slopes as the main analysis (i.e., by-dyad random slopes corresponding 
to Generation and Conceptualisation, by-participant random slopes corresponding to 
Generation and Conceptualisation and by-item random slopes corresponding to Generation 
and Conceptualisation). In other words, random slopes corresponding to Acceptance and 
Short-term reuse were not included in the final model because the variability associated with 
these random effects was equal to zero, implying that it was not necessary to control for these 
variables in this analysis (the results were identical regardless of whether or not these slopes 
were included in the model). Because the random structure was identical to that used in the 
main analysis, the results were also identical to those of the main analysis (i.e., only a 
significant effect of Conceptualisation was found, F(1, 29) = 114.57, p < .001). The model 
parameters were also identical to those found in the main analysis (see Table A2; because the 
parameters were identical to those reported previously, they are not reported again in this 
appendix). This confirms that Conceptualisation significantly affected reuse in this 
experiment, regardless of potential acceptance and/or short-term reuse.  
